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11 The labor theory of justice
Chandran Kukathas
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems of
thought. So John Rawls famously proclaimed in the beginning of his
masterwork, A Theory of Justice. A theory however elegant and economi-
cal must be rejected or revised if untrue. Laws and institutions no matter
how efficient and well arranged must be reformed or abolished if unjust.
Justice, perhaps unlike some other values, was not something we might
readily trade a little of in exchange for other benefits.1 In his critique of
Rawls, Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen proposes to take justice
more seriously while at the same time conceding that justice might justi-
fiably be traded off against other goods.2 His objection to Rawls is that he
has, without warrant, presented justice as quite compatible with exten-
sive social inequality when inequalities serve to improve the condition of
the worst off or least advantaged in society. If a departure from equal-
ity is what is necessary to improve the condition of the least fortunate
then departing from equality may have to be countenanced; but such a
departure is unjust. If Rawls truly takes justice to be as important as he
proclaims, he must not present justice as a notion whose meaning must
be revised to take into account the feasibility of sustaining some kinds of
social institutions. In particular, he must not build into the conception
of justice he defends the idea that very unequal rewards for the talented
are just when they induce them to produce more – even if this is to the
benefit of all.
In Cohen’s view, a just society is one in which the distribution of bene-
fits and burdens is roughly equal and in which differences of distributive
outcome are not simply a matter of luck. Any society in which such differ-
ences are permitted to prevail is, by that fact, unjust. If permitting such
differences – and the inequalities they entail – is necessary to improve the
1 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edn (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), ch. 1, sect. 1, p. 3.
2 Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
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condition of those who are badly off, the only conclusion we can draw
is that it may be an unhappy truth that, in some circumstances, we can
improve the welfare of the poor only by condoning injustice. In Cohen’s
view, however, it is not the case that individual welfare can be increased
only by abandoning (the egalitarian idea of) justice. In a nutshell, Cohen
wants to show that three important ideals: welfare, freedom, and justice
are compatible ideals that are jointly achievable. None needs to be sac-
rificed in order to secure either or both of the others. His objection to
the Rawlsian conception of justice, then, is that it is guilty of two sins:
first, it forswears equality; and, second, it miscalls the theory of justified
inequality a theory of justice. The first sin is one Rawls should not commit
because of the importance he claims to attach to justice, and need not
commit because jettisoning equality is not necessary to promote welfare.
The second sin is one Rawls has committed because he does not wish to
be seen to be jettisoning justice when he condones inequality, but to be
absolved of this sin he would need to recognize that abandoning equality
is inconsistent with a proper regard for justice, and to dedicate himself
to a more uncompromisingly egalitarian view of justice.
The question I wish to consider here is whether Cohen’s approach
to the problem of justice is broadly tenable. One reason to examine
his argument might be in order to vindicate John Rawls, and over the
years many of Cohen’s critics have sought to do just that. My concern,
however, is not to defend Rawls’s approach to justice, nor, for that matter,
his theory of justice. It is rather to ask whether Cohen’s way of thinking
about justice is defensible in its own terms.
There are several issues I wish to raise in considering whether Cohen
succeeds in showing that welfare, freedom, and egalitarian justice are
jointly achievable. First, I want to examine more closely the feasibility of
the socioeconomic arrangements Cohen’s theory requires and the metric
of justice it invokes. Second, I want to consider the role that the ethos
of justice plays in his theory. Third, I want to ask whether we should
accept the view of human nature that underlies Cohen’s analysis. Fourth,
I want to ask whether his theory succeeds both in the world of ideal
theory and in the world of nonideal theory, as I think Cohen believes it
does.
Cohen’s challenge
Rawls’s view is that it is justifiable, and therefore just, for the talented to
be rewarded more highly for their contributions to society. It is justifiable
because so rewarding them will raise the welfare of society overall and
thus the welfare of the least well off, who would otherwise fare worse. It
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is just, roughly speaking, because it is justifiable. Cohen argues that it is
neither. It is not just because it requires a departure from equality, and
it is not justifiable because a departure from equality is not warranted.
By equality Cohen does not mean a condition in which everyone has
the same income or wealth, for he accepts that there must be some
differences in any society. It is justifiable for some to earn more because
they expend more effort than others; and it is no less justifiable for others
to earn more because they assume greater burdens in order to do so.
What is not defensible is for those who are more talented to earn more
simply by virtue of their good fortune in having been born talented –
with talent here understood to mean simply the capacity to earn more. It
is unjust for some people to be rewarded simply because they were lucky
enough to be born with certain gifts. Moreover, in a just society no one
can rightly demand to be more highly rewarded because their unearned
talents enable them to be more productive. It would be wrong (because
it would violate freedom) to force the talented into more productive
labor; but it would be equally wrong of them to refuse to engage in more
productive labor unless they were more highly compensated. They can
only so refuse on the grounds that they prefer some alternative activity,
such as a different occupation or leisure, as a means to self-realization.
To refuse to produce without extra compensation for one’s productivity
is to act unjustly.
Consider a possible distribution D1 in which the talented and untal-
ented enjoy income equality (leaving to one side issues of the unequal
burdensomeness of different kinds of labor and differing levels of effort).
By raising the rewards the talented can garner, we might be able to move
to a Pareto-superior condition D2 in which the untalented enjoy greater
welfare, purchased by the unequal inducements offered to the talented.
In D2 there is greater overall welfare, including greater welfare for the
untalented, but substantial inequality between talented and untalented.
But there is also a possible distribution D3, in which the level of overall
welfare is equivalent to D2 but the bounty produced by the work of the
talented is equally shared. If it is possible to move from D1 to D2, Cohen
argues, then it is no less possible in principle to move from D1 to D3.
The talented have no practical reason not to do what’s needed (shifting
their efforts to the most productive endeavors) to move from D1 to D3,
since they would be better off in doing so. They also have no reason of
justice to decline to do so unless they are offered even greater rewards
since shifting their efforts is something they are in fact prepared to do. To
refuse to do so in an effort to gain an unequal share of benefits is unjust.
It would only be just to decline if one found the shifting of one’s efforts
burdensome or inconsistent with one’s pursuit of self-realization.
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Cohen supplies a practical illustration of this view. An individual
named A has the following preference ordering across three job-and-
income packages:
First preference: a doctor’s at £50k
Second preference: a gardener’s at £20k
Third preference: a doctor’s at £20k
The community is £30k better off if A becomes a doctor at £20k as the
surplus produced could be shared by everyone. Since none of the options
is burdensome to A, who would be willing to be a doctor at £20k, the
just course for A to take is to become a doctor at £20k. If she declines to
do so she is no better than an extortionist who is holding the community
to ransom. She might claim that gardening, not doctoring, is her heart’s
desire; but that cannot be true if she is willing to give up gardening for
doctoring plus extra money. A just society would tax away the surplus and
redistribute it equally; and a just person would shift her efforts toward
those unburdensome activities that benefited those who are worse off, at
least to the extent that this was compatible with her self-realization, and
accept with alacrity the just redistribution of the fruits of her talent.
There is an old joke about a wealthy man who asks a woman if she
would sleep with him if he promised to give a fabulous sum of money to
a worthy charity. When the woman agrees, he asks whether she would
be willing to sleep with him for a very small donation to charity. She
refuses, protesting: what kind of woman do you think I am?We’ve already
established that, the wealthy man replies; now we’re just haggling about
the price. Cohen’s criticism of the doctor who says she longs to be a
gardener seems to be that her willingness to haggle makes her no better
than anyone else trying to extort money by withholding her assets. All
her protestations to the contrary should be recognized for what they re-
ally are.
In a just society individuals would not look upon the laws that govern
them as mere rules in a game – constraints they must work within in
the pursuit of their own advantage. Social relations in a just society are
relations not among bargainers, each looking out for his own interests, but
among members of a community, for whom mutuality and fellow feeling
are important goods. A just society is one whose distributive laws are just,
and whose members live by the spirit of those laws whose distributive
purposes they warmly embrace.
It is perhaps worth remarking upon how demanding is Cohen’s stan-
dard. He takes very seriously the importance of freedom of occupation
and is unwilling in any way to coerce individuals into work they dis-
dain as burdensome or unfulfilling. The task he sets himself is that of
demonstrating how it might be possible to preserve equality, freedom,
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and Pareto-improved welfare simultaneously. The case of the doctor-
gardener illustrates the trilemma that arises when pursuing this task. But
the standard he demands of the agents in his illustration is also an exact-
ing one. If the gardener is willing to doctor for £50k this establishes that
she is willing to doctor and that her claim to prefer gardening to doctor-
ing must be taken with a grain of salt. What she really prefers is money
and she is much closer to indifference between gardening and doctoring
than she says, or imagines. Now presumably this would be true even if it
took an offer not of an extra £30k to get her to switch from gardening to
doctoring but, say, an offer of an extra £30 million. Some might want to
interpret this as meaning that this person really loves gardening – after
all, it took £30 million to persuade her to abandon it for doctoring. But,
for Cohen, if I’ve understood him correctly, this is just a matter of hag-
gling about the price. She is, after all, willing to forgo gardening in favor
of doctoring at some price. Only someone who said, I wouldn’t abandon
gardening to become a doctor for all the money in the world, could really
be said to be motivated by something other than money.
Cohen thinks that a world in which egalitarian justice prevails without
serious loss of freedom or reduction of welfare is possible as well as highly
desirable. There is no need to jettison justice either by abandoning the
egalitarian ideal or redefining justice to fit a social system that has already
done so.
Feasibility issues
Cohen is fully alive to the problem of whether the society he imagines and
commends is feasible. One obvious problem is that without institutions
that reward people according to their productivity the size of the social
product will diminish and everyone, including the least advantaged, will
be worse off. Rawls’s willingness to depart from equality is predicated on
a concern that insisting on equality will be impoverishing. If that is truly
the case, Cohen notes, then we must ruefully conclude that the price
of leaving the impoverished state is injustice. But in what sense is it not
feasible for us to have a society in which equality does not lead to lower
productivity? One important reason is that if they are not generously
rewarded the talented will not produce the surplus they are capable of,
lacking any incentive to do so. Yet while that may be true in a world in
which material incentives dominate the desire to be just, must it also be
true in a world in which an egalitarian ethos prevails? Cohen argues not.
The move from D1 to D2 seems to dominate the other possible move
from D1 to D3; but that is only in a society in which the motivations
of individuals are primarily to pursue personal advantage without regard
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for the equal welfare of others. In a society in which different motivations
prevail – in which people care directly about being egalitarianly just – the
talented will not be inclined to work less or in less productive endeavors
when rewards are equal. Thus the doctor-gardener who is willing to work
as a doctor for £20k will not hold out for £50k and turn to gardening if
the extra £30k is not forthcoming.
Leave to one side for the moment the question of whether people can
indeed be so committed to justice that this motivation comprehensively
trumps self-interest. Let us assume a world in which egalitarian justice
and mutual concern are the dominant motives. Would a world without
differential income incentives be feasible if we want to generate the wealth
needed to significantly raise standards of welfare? Even in a world in
which people’s motivations were highly altruistic, they are unlikely to
know, in the absence of price signals in the form of different rewards
for various forms of labor, which activities are most productive. It would
not be enough to have a society of Stakhanovs who are resolved simply
to work harder. It is important that they produce what is valued. In a
market economy, prices direct factors of production, including labor, to
their most valued uses. Since most factors of production have competing
uses, prices are bid up until there is only one buyer for the marginal unit
demanded. If that unit is a unit of labor its price will reflect the demand
for the talents of the person whose labor is sought. In the absence of
pricing it is difficult, if not impossible, to know where best to deploy
society’s talents. Producers need to employ people with particular skills
in order to produce and they compete with other producers by offering
the highest prices they can to get the workers they want. High prices
for some skills induce more people to acquire those skills, just as low
prices incline them to consider acquiring others. If producers cannot
compete for the best labor by offering higher prices, labor is not going to
be directed to its most productive use. If the hospital does not offer the
gardener earning £20k an extra £30k to become a doctor, how would
she know that doctoring is more socially valuable?
One possibility is that a market economy is established but the gains
made by the talented in highly productive endeavors are taxed away. The
price signals direct the talented to work that is most socially beneficial,
but because everyone is committed to the ideal of egalitarian justice,
no one is deterred from choosing productive work simply because the
post-tax reward is too low. The pre-tax reward is their only guide. Is
this possibility plausible? One point that must be considered is that not
only employees but also producers need to respond to and send out
price signals. The producer must bid for the worker whose talents, at the
right price, would help him run or build or improve his enterprise. In an
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egalitarian just society, however, the producer does not keep the gains
from his success in picking the best people and inducing them to work
for him. He simply gets to keep an equal post-tax share. The producer,
while competing with other producers for labor and other inputs for his
enterprise, will therefore be in a situation in which, whether his enterprise
succeeds or fails, he will receive a roughly equal post-tax share. Indeed,
all producers would be in this position. So what will motivate producers
to bid for resources and ensure that they get the labor and other materials
they need to run, build, or improve their enterprises? It should in part
be a sense that by doing their jobs right they are contributing to the
improvement of the welfare of society overall. It could also be that they
derive some satisfaction from the activity of producing or running an
enterprise, which might be their own particular path to self-fulfillment or
self-realization. What they cannot be motivated by is a desire to enrich
themselves, or a fear that they will lose everything, for neither of these
outcomes is possible.
If this is the society Cohen has in mind then it is a society which is a
market economy in which most gains above rough equality of welfare are
taxed away and redistributed, but whose members are motivated to work
and produce as though they kept their pre-tax earnings – perhaps because
the satisfaction they gained from the thought that they were contributing
to the welfare of all was as good as keeping all or most of those earnings
for themselves.3 It is important to note that people must be motivated
not merely to work hard but also to take initiative and to innovate even
though success will bring no further personal rewards. In short, people
must behave as if they were in a normalmarket economy in which rewards
accrue to those who take risks and succeed, and to those who are able to
make the most of their talents. The question is, what reason is there to
think that people could ever be persuaded or led to behave in this way?
Even if it were possible to convince the talented employee to choose the
most socially useful job because he would have had it deliveredmore post-
tax income, it’s not clear that such a regime would successfully produce
those people whose talents are brought out best by the burning desire
to make it rich. Would the promise of no substantial gain be enough to
motivate someone to forgo present consumption to invest in an enterprise
that might produce spectacular gains that go primarily to others who have
forgone nothing? If the gardener is induced to turn doctor for no extra
3 This is roughly the view of Joseph Carens, whose brilliant book, Equality, Incentives and
the Market (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), defends a theory of post-tax
income equality in a market society. Cohen commends Carens’s work. For a convincing
critique of Carens, see D. R. Steele, From Marx to Mises (La Salle, IL: Open Court,
1992).
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reward it might be because she is persuaded that her medical skills will
benefit others more than her gardening. But will she be likely also to forgo
consumption to invest some of her income in other enterprises when she
can be sure that she will not only have less for herself now but at best only
a little more in the future? Perhaps the answer to all these questions is a
resounding yes; but it is not obvious why it might be. People can certainly
be motivated by their love of others, and by their sense of what is right.
But some of their actions are motivated by the desire for economic gain.
Is there any evidence that eliminating this source of motivation will in
no way reduce the productive capacity of a society? Cohen would have
to convince us of this to persuade us that a society without real income
differences could be as productive as one in which only two of the three
sources of motivation operated. Even if he could persuade us that self-
interest4 is not as important as wemight think, he would need to convince
us that the other two forms of motivation could supplant it entirely. This
seems to me highly unlikely. If so, the society Cohen commends to us is
not feasible.
The ethos of a just society
Cohen’s argument relies substantially on the claim that a just society is
one whosemembers are imbued with a strong sense of justice. An ethos of
justice prevails such that people are inclined to regard the rules of justice
not merely as rules of the game that they are at liberty to manipulate to
their own advantage but as requirements they should honor in spirit as
well as to the letter. It is this that would incline them to take the more
socially productive job even if it did not bring them personal gain because
they would recognize that justice would justify their receiving an unequal
share only if they assumed heavier burdens, and that justice would not
condone their trading off work for leisure because work is not financially
rewarding. Cohen thinks Rawls is insufficiently attuned to the importance
of the ethos of justice and too readily assumes that it is fine formembers of
society governed by the principles of justice as fairness to ignore the spirit
of these principles (and especially the difference principle) by seeking to
enrich themselves within the constraints they establish. In a just society,
in Cohen’s view, people would expect to be rewarded for their effort, but
not to be rewarded for their talent. They would choose a less socially
productive job over a more productive one only because doing so would
4 Note that self-interest need not mean selfishness here, but simply an interest in making
gains that one might use for altruistic purposes.
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139940924.014
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Singapore Management University (SMU), on 15 Oct 2019 at 02:50:02, subject to the
The labor theory of justice 243
be consistent with the pursuit of self-realization, but not because it would
bring them (unequal) material gains.
Before considering the matter of the ethos of justice directly, let me
address a couple of preliminary problems. First, there is the distinction
Cohen appeals to between reward for effort and reward for talent (the
latter being regarded as morally arbitrary). The question is how readily
we can draw this distinction between effort rewards and talent rewards.
Consider the case of John the philosopher. John works hard as a student
to become an excellent philosopher; further effort early in his career
makes him even more excellent, and eventually he is rewarded with a
high-paying job at an excellent research university with low teaching and a
stimulating research culture. His case forms a slight contrast with another
philosopher, Robert, who does not work quite so hard and becomes a less
good philosopher. He succeeds nonetheless in securing a teaching post
but not at the kind of institution he longs to be in. He does good work, but
spends his career in a more modest university than John’s, where he finds
the teaching burdensome, his research opportunities more limited, and
his salary modest. John now earns much more than Robert, even though
Robert now works much harder in a job he finds more burdensome than
John finds his. Robert is worse off than John because he worked less hard
at T1, even though he now works very hard at T2. John is reaping the
benefits of working very hard at T1, even though he now works less hard.
There are at least two questions here. John is being rewarded because
his university hired him for his talent, but is it his talent that is being
rewarded or his early effort? After all, he could not have acquired his
philosophical skill without making great effort, even if it is true that
effort alone will not turn anyone into a good philosopher. Equally, in
Robert’s case, is he worse off for his lack of talent or because he failed
to make an effort early in his career, since he might now be a skilled
philosopher had he only worked hard sooner? I assume that it is not open
for Cohen to suggest that John’s talent included an inclination to work
hard at an early age, since the point is to draw a distinction between effort
and talent. The point, however, is that it is not clear how we will draw the
distinction between reward for talent and reward for effort since talent is
often the product of effort, or only uncovered through effort. The second
question that arises out of this example is whether there is any kind of
statute of limitations on reward for effort? Making serious efforts early in
life can pay off handsomely later, particularly when those efforts are in
effect a kind of investment in one’s own human capital. This may make it
possible to expend less effort later in life for greater rewards. If we should
only reward people unequally if they have made more effort, should we
count only their current efforts or their earlier ‘investment’ efforts?
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139940924.014
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Singapore Management University (SMU), on 15 Oct 2019 at 02:50:02, subject to the
244 Chandran Kukathas
The second preliminary problem concerns the claim that the pursuit of
self-realization is a justifiable reason for declining to take a more socially
productive job. It is the basis for the justification of freedom of occu-
pation, which cannot be justified on the grounds that people should be
at liberty to take one job over another because it offers greater material
rewards. The question is why self-realization should be regarded as a
morally worthy end – so worthy that it justifies allowing choice in occu-
pation in a way that pursuit of greater income does not. It seems odd
given that self-realization is a peculiarly self-centered reason. It seems
even harder to defend when it’s quite possible that people will seek mate-
rial gain for non-self-centered reasons: to make money to promote an
ideal, or to promote the glory of God, to build great enterprises. On the
other hand, if self-realization matters, it should be recognized that money
may be an important route to self-realization. This may be because what
one believes will be fulfilling requires resources. In this case, the pursuit
of money may be indirectly a pursuit of self-realization. Or it may be that
some people don’t know what they will find self-realizing and wish to
take the best paying jobs because they want to accumulate the resources
they might need till they figure out what they want to pursue. Finally,
individuals might find it possible to self-realize in more ways and choose
according to the opportunities afforded by different kinds of rewards
offered by different jobs. If £20k is on offer I might seek fulfillment as
a gardener; but if £50k is on offer I might become a doctor, save the
extra £30k to become a patron of the arts, or a wine connoisseur, or
indulge a passion for sailing. (Also, one wonders why being willing to
give up gardening at £20k for doctoring for £50k implies that one’s pas-
sion for gardening as a route to self-realization is in question. Perhaps it
says something about how strong the passion is; but the fact that one is
prepared to give it up does not mean it does not exist at all.)
Leaving these difficulties to one side (not least because Cohen might
well have good replies to them!), there is still the claim that a just society
is one whose members share an ethos of justice. In this case, it is an ethos
of egalitarianism. The two questions I wish to raise about this ethos
concern its scope and the manner in which it is brought into existence.
First, the matter of scope. It seems reasonable to think that norms of
distributive justice whose point is equality depend upon the members of
the distributive community embracing the spirit of equality. They must
be willing, at the very least, not to try to get around the rules of justice
even as they obey them to the letter. But the question is, what is the
relevant distributive community that might share such an ethos? Possible
candidates include local communities (such as neighborhoods or perhaps
counties), townships, provinces, states, superstates, and earth. (I suspect
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that Cohen is thinking of the state as the relevant distributive community
for his analysis.)
If the relevant distributive community is small, it seems plausible that
an ethos might develop such that everyone is willing to accept the rules
of distribution and try to honor them in spirit. A sense of belonging
or togetherness or shared purpose might well serve to sustain such a
spirit. But can an egalitarian ethos be sustained in a larger distributive
community, such as a state? The evidence may not be conclusive, but it
suggests it might be difficult – at least to the degree Cohen’s egalitarian
justice requires. To be sure, there do exist states that seem to have highly
egalitarian economic systems, at least as compared with highly unequal
societies such as the USA and Singapore (to take two examples based on
Gini coefficients). But even such states do exhibit high degrees of income
inequality and wealth inequality, as well as capital and human emigration
to escape high taxation. One can only speculate about the reasons why an
egalitarian ethos (or any individually demanding distributive ethos)might
be hard to sustain. A large entity like a state might simply be too large
for its members to feel they share any deep bonds with distant strangers.
States are also typically made up of regions to which people feel separate
loyalties, which may make it doubly difficult to establish an ethos of state-
wide egalitarianism, even if people are regional or local egalitarians. And
states, especially large states, are more likely to be marked by diversities
that foster loyalties to particular groups, traditions, cultures, or nations,
at the expense of loyalty to norms of distribution that cut across such
attachments. This need not mean that there can be no shared ethos in
large, diverse, societies; but it may mean that it is difficult to develop one
that is deep enough to sustain a commitment to significant distributive
equality.
The fact of diversity may pose another problem for the establishment
of an egalitarian ethos. To the extent that different people hold different
views about what is valuable in life, what they seek to equalize may differ,
and this may cut against the possibility of securing equality along such
dimensions as income or wealth. Consider the following case. Traditional
Australian Aboriginal societies are generally profoundly egalitarian with
respect to resources, with weak practices of private property, particularly
in land. But within Australia, Aboriginal communities also own large
tracts of land that are not exploited for commercial gain but occupied
and tended in accordance with the cultural traditions of the peoples
who inhabit them. The material resources contained therein are thus not
available to non-Aboriginal Australians. On a view of equality of income,
there might be a case for exploitation of the land to extract the material
benefits it might yield – so as to distribute these benefits equally among all
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Australians, and particularly to the poor, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
alike. Yet Aborigines might view using such a metric with horror since it
would ride roughshod over their traditions. Even if one took the view that
justice required that we do so, it is hard to see why they might come to
embrace the egalitarian ethos that needs to be cultivated to make such a
redistribution sustainable. One could identify similar predicaments with
respect to other cultural groups, from Canadian Indians to the Amish of
Pennsylvania.
The other problem is how an egalitarian ethos might be brought into
existence. I take it to be an assumption of Cohen’s work that, as things
stand at present, no society exhibits the kind of ethos that would be
needed to sustain egalitarian justice. But in principle it should be possi-
ble for such an ethos to emerge or be created, or the point of defending
egalitarian justice in the way Cohen does would be lost. Cohen’s view
seems to be that it is, in principle, possible to socialize (in more than one
sense of the term!) people to embrace or develop the ethos he describes.
Yet within the state, the factors that have constrained the emergence
of a deep egalitarian ethos – size and diversity – might also constrain
attempts deliberately to socialize people into accepting suitably egalitar-
ian attitudes. If diversity is left untouched, populations remain mobile,
and new people enter the country, it may be difficult to sustain efforts
to create an ethos. It might be difficult to create any deep, shared ethical
commitment beyond the idea of justice as adherence to the law in the
pursuit of one’s own ends, private material ends included.
Ideal and nonideal theory
One obvious question to ask is whether, in the just society Cohen envis-
ages, there would be any warrant for coerced taxation. If people could
be socialized into being just egalitarians, why would there be any need
to force them to contribute to the equal welfare of their fellows. Cohen’s
view is that in a truly just society there would be no need for coercive
measures since people would willingly give what is required. There would
still probably be a state, which operates as a central organizing body that
proposes a tax structure of egalitarian inspiration, around which peo-
ple would voluntarily coordinate. The world ideal theory describes is a
world without such coercion; indeed it could not coherently be a world in
which such coercion existed because that would be inconsistent with the
existence of an ethos of willing compliance with the demands of justice.
In the case of nonideal theory, however, coercive taxation (though
not coerced labor) would be permitted by Cohen’s theory because the
electorate that voted in a wholeheartedly egalitarian government might
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be only half-heartedly egalitarian itself. State coercion is permitted in a
society in which citizens do not affirm and act upon the correct principles
of justice.
Would this work? The problem here seems to be that the only way to
sustain an egalitarian distribution with a high standard of living would
be if there is actually an egalitarian ethos. Otherwise, people will only
produce enough to improve material welfare if they could keep more for
themselves. It’s the egalitarian ethos that leads them to work as if they
kept the gains they produced individually but accept that these gains
would be redistributed equally. If there’s no egalitarian ethos, as is by
hypothesis the case in the nonideal world, the justification for coercive
taxation to enforce egalitarian justice would disappear – since it would
succeed only in diminishing the size of the total available for distribution.
Cohen might, of course, say that coercive taxation is justified for other
reasons, such as to raise revenue to improve the welfare of the worst off
or to provide for public goods, but it could not be because it would serve
the purpose of egalitarian distributive justice without loss of real welfare
of the sort he favors.
Cohen and human nature
My aim in this chapter has been largely to raise some problems I find
with the theory G. A. Cohen has been trying to develop. I have not tried
to provide a comprehensive refutation of his view but have sought, rather,
to try to see if the argument can stand in its own terms. This is by way
of exploration with a view to developing a fuller critique if the criticisms
I have offered are on the right track.
But I’d like to end with some reflection on the general presupposi-
tions underlying the viewpoint Cohen has defended. It seems to me that
there are two assumptions about human nature that run through Cohen’s
thinking, neither of which I find compelling, but both of which have,
nonetheless, a distinguished philosophical pedigree. The first assump-
tion is that what I shall loosely call the self-interested element in human
nature is not a permanent or ineradicable feature of the human condition.
The second is that we can, through appropriate efforts at social trans-
formation, eradicate it to build a world in which, even among distant
strangers, relations are governed by norms of fellow mutuality and fel-
low feeling, and not by self-interest. Cohen’s dissatisfaction with Rawls, I
think, stems from the thought that Rawls concedes too much, or panders,
to self-interest. Worse still, Rawls calls this pandering justice. (These, I
hasten to add, are my words rather than Cohen’s.) Rawls in effect offers
a defense of a social system that rests on an acceptance of a particular
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element of human nature; but the cost of doing so is the construction of
a moral theory from which justice has been jettisoned.
Cohen’s aim is to rescue justice and bring it back to its rightful place
as the egalitarian ideal that should govern the good society. But the good
society he describes cannot be one inhabited by the beings that Rawls
imagines. It must be one peopled by individuals who are not merely
equals but egalitarians. Indeed not merely people who hold egalitarian
principles but have embraced them so whole-heartedly that they will live
by them and not just be governed (coercively) by them.
In this respect, Cohen seems to me to be entirely true to his Marxist
roots. The denizens of modern society are not self-seeking and competi-
tive by their very nature; they are merely made this way by their historical
circumstances. But this is not a permanent condition. A just society is
possible because human beings can be transformed.
If I am right about this, then the task before Cohen is a daunting one.
In order for his view of justice to be persuasive, he would have to convince
us – or at least me – that human beings can be very different from what
we know.
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